Thursday, August 31, 2006

Keepers of the Public Trust?

The link:

http://www.thesanitycheck.com/BobsSanityCheckBlog/tabid/56/EntryID/437/Default.aspx

DTCC: " A Little Rape is No Big Deal - Why Is Everyone Bent Out of Shape?"

Location: Blogs Bob O'Brien's Sanity Check Blog

Posted by: bobo 8/31/2006 7:18 AM

The DTCC just released a beautifully crafted piece which highlights the problems with that privately held company.

What is stunning is that whoever put this together was oblivious to the irony it contains.

You can view it here:

http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20060831005438&newsLang=en

The piece starts off by saying that it is unable to find any data that corroborates "many" of the facts and statistics used in the recent Forbes article.

Now, first off, Liz Moyer's first rev of her article had one innacuracy, in terms of the trading price. That was only up for an hour or two, that I can recall. In an email to her, she indicated that there was some garbled info from the transfer agent and the company, where something got lost in the back and forth messages.

It changed nothing about the veracity of the story, nor the point of it - incredibly high levels of fails in a company - 27 million fails in a stock with 1.1 million shares issued and outstanding.

The error was corrected almost as soon as the article appeared.

That is the only data that the DTCC is unable to corroborate, yet it makes a point of devoting 1/5 of the piece to the quickly fixed stock price error, and further sets the tone of the release with it.

Would that the DTCC corrected their errors in anywhere nearly that sort of timely fashion. The Global Links fiasco is still unfixed, a year and a half after Senator Bennett demanded and investigation.

The DTCC makes the dollar value of the "error" in the system's handling of the Global Links shares the point of the story. The problem with that is that they fail to acknowledge that the reverse split cut the number of shares by 350. Thus, a share that was trading at, say, 0.02, should have been trading at $7 post split. But more importantly, by not correcting the number of shares trading, the occurrence in Global Links effectively slashed its market cap by 99.7%.

Now, the DTCC apparently feels that slashing a company's market cap by 99.7% is OK. No big deal. It happens. Gotta break some eggs to make an omelet. No need to fix it within a year or two of it happening. Whatever.

What it doesn't say is more important.

It doesn't say that the mistake in re-pricing and re-numbering the Global Links shares, if error it was, should have been corrected within a few days, if not hours, of it taking place. It doesn't say that the market cap of the company was destroyed, diluted down to nothing. It doesn't explain why the SEC didn't immediately stop trading. It doesn't explain why the participants who made the "error" get to keep the money, while the investors and the company lose. It doesn't discuss the windfall profits made by anyone with a huge short position in the stock - possibly the same market makers who traded it as a "mistake."

No, instead it trivializes the issue by using sleight of hand calculations.

But here's the best part. It also shows its true colors with this statement regarding reverse splits:

"However, among sub-penny stocks, these activities may occur more often to try and artificially raise the stock's price."

Huh. "Artificially" increase the price? You mean by reducing the number of shares, thereby legitimately increasing the per share value? That is artificial? Huh. How is it artificial? The market cap stays the same. The share count is reduced, but the price is adjusted to reflect each ownership unit having 350 times more value.

Doesn't it seem that is kind of like trying to blame the victim for doing a split? What is the difference between this statement, and the statement, "However, among hussies and women of loose morals, short skirts are often worn to stir the passions of innocent men" - when explaining a rape?

Does everyone get that this is a private company, owned by the same participants who benefit financially from these sorts of errors, issuing press releases to blame the victim?

And to smear the messenger? Forbes is riddled with inaccuracies, the company is up to shenanigans due to its treatment of its stock. And if you use our math, it's no big deal.

I love these sorts of releases. They underscore how self-serving and one sided this privately-owned entity is, and how uninterested they are in protecting issuers. The message is clearly that, you can reduce the market cap of a company by 99.7%, make short sellers rich in the process, but that's all good. In the scheme of things, it's just another day at the office for the DTCC.

Note no explanation of why 18 months later, nothing has been done to make the company or the investors whole. Note no remorse over it. Note nothing but arrogance and dismissal, and attack.
Anyone surprised? That it took a week is almost as funny as the content of the piece. In addition to being glacial in fixing actions that destroy issuers' market caps, they are not particularly nimble in the PR department, either.

Wednesday, August 30, 2006

Everybody Knows but Nothing Changes

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a387ALHm8OlU&refer=news

Naked Short Sellers Hurt Companies With Stock They Don't Have

By Bob Drummond

Aug. 4 (Bloomberg) -- Movie Gallery Inc. shares fell 20 percent on Feb. 3, their biggest nosedive in almost a decade. At the time, there didn't seem to be a reason for the jaw-dropping rout.

Analysts who follow Dothan, Alabama-based Movie Gallery, the second-largest video rental chain in the U.S., speculated that investors were spooked after a large money manager cut its stake or that they were worried sales wouldn't meet expectations.

Another possible factor surfaced two weeks later, and it had nothing to do with financial performance. On Feb. 17, the Nasdaq Stock Market added Movie Gallery to a list of stocks considered, under a new U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regulation, to be at risk for manipulation by naked short sellers.

In naked shorting, traders who hope to profit from falling prices sell shares without borrowing stock. Using that strategy, naked short sellers can drive down prices by flooding the market with orders to sell shares they don't have.

``These people are lying, they're cheating and they're stealing,'' says Wes Christian, a Houston lawyer who represents Internet discount retailer Overstock.com Inc. and more than a dozen other companies that say their stocks were pummeled by naked shorting. ``This is, in our opinion, the biggest commercial fraud in U.S. history.''

Movie Gallery Chief Financial Officer Thomas Johnson says he has asked the SEC to investigate whether naked short sellers helped undercut the stock.

`It's Extremely Frustrating'

``I'm throwing out the towel, saying `Help me,''' Johnson, 43, says. ``There are rules designed to deal with this, and people are still managing to do these naked short sales. It's extremely frustrating. It's like being on the front line and people are shooting you from every direction.''

In traditional short selling, traders rely on a strategy that's the mirror opposite of the time-honored adage to buy low and sell high. Short sellers borrow stock through a broker and hope to profit by selling shares high and later buying them back at lower prices to repay the loan.

Naked short sellers do the same thing, with one difference: They don't borrow any shares. Naked short selling isn't illegal in most cases, unless authorities can prove fraud, such as a scheme to manipulate stock prices.

The threat to investors arises because traders in naked short sales aren't limited by the number of shares available to borrow. If a naked short seller doesn't intend to borrow stock, he can pump a theoretically unlimited volume of sales into the market, driving down a company's shares.

`They Can Overwhelm'

Instead of hoping a stock will fall, like a traditional short seller, an unscrupulous naked short seller may be able to help make it happen.

``If they don't have to borrow shares, there's nothing that keeps someone from selling and selling and hammering the market with sell orders,'' says Leslie Boni, a former University of New Mexico finance professor who studied naked short selling as a visiting scholar at the SEC in 2003 and 2004.

``They can overwhelm the number of buyers, and as the buyers dry up, the price keeps dropping,'' she says.

When Movie Gallery's stock crashed on Feb. 3, short sellers sold almost 750,000 shares, or 11 percent of the shares traded that day, according to short-sale records compiled by Nasdaq.

Daily short sales averaged almost 370,000 shares over the first eight days of February, up from 70,000 on Jan. 31, while the stock plunged 36 percent to $3.47 from $5.45. As the stock was falling, a growing number of sellers weren't delivering shares to buyers, a warning sign under SEC rules of possible naked short selling.

`Warping the Market'

Nasdaq put Movie Gallery on its list of companies at risk of manipulation because from trades through Feb. 8, those undelivered shares topped 160,000, or 0.5 percent of Movie Gallery's total shares. When companies surpass that threshold, SEC rules impose restrictions on further short selling.

Patrick Byrne, chief executive officer of Salt Lake City- based Overstock.com, has been the most vocal executive charging that abusive short-selling schemes are draining the lifeblood from many companies.

``I've been pouring kerosene on myself and setting myself on fire because I think there are global, systematic issues with naked short selling,'' Byrne, 43, says. ``It's warping the market price of some small-cap companies and destroying American entrepreneurship.''

As of July 10, Overstock.com had been on Nasdaq's list of potential naked-short-selling targets every day since April 22, 2005, and its shares had fallen 45 percent over that period.

`It's a Nonissue'

Investors who specialize in selling short say naked shorting is rare and complaints from supposed victims are overblown. ``The phrase I would use would be red herring,'' says Jim Chanos, 48, who runs Kynikos Associates Ltd., a New York-based hedge fund firm known for short selling.

He says he's never used naked short selling as a technique. ``It sounds ominous, it sounds nefarious and, by and large, it's a nonissue in the marketplace,'' he says.

Wall Street traders have long thought that most complaints about naked short selling come from executives at poorly managed companies looking for a scapegoat when investors sour on their stocks, says Peter Chepucavage, a securities lawyer who has worked for the SEC and is now at Plexus Consulting Group LLC in Washington.

``The Street's view is that this never was a real problem, and that these guys are whiners,'' he says.

`Play by the Rules'

Phillip Marcum, CEO of Denver-based Metretek Technologies Inc., says he doesn't need excuses for his company's performance and generally doesn't give short sellers a second thought. ``We're a real company, with real investors and real revenue,'' says Marcum, 62, whose company sells commercial electricity- backup systems and meters to measure gas-well production.

Metretek shares quintupled in the 12 months through the end of March, when the company announced a $28 million sale of additional stock.

Still, the American Stock Exchange on April 10 put Metretek on its list of potential naked-shorting targets because of an increase in shares that weren't delivered to buyers. On March 30, Metretek's shares fell almost 7 percent as sales rocketed to 169,000 shares from a daily average of 11,000 a week earlier.

``You can't control somebody who shorts stock,'' Marcum says. ``But they've got to play by the rules. It seems to me, there ought to be severe penalties if you sell short without borrowing the stock. Can't they find out who's doing this and do something about these people?''

Enforcement Actions Coming

The short answer is no. The SEC puts most of its restrictions on brokerages, not naked short sellers. In one exception, SEC rules forbid naked short sales in connection with stock offerings. The SEC and exchanges have been investigating possible fraud in those instances.

``This is an area where we have seen problems, and you can expect enforcement actions,'' said Susan Merrill, the New York Stock Exchange's regulation enforcement chief, speaking to a securities industry conference in June.

In the past three years, the SEC has imposed a total of just under $24 million in penalties in five cases alleging that traders and investment firms illegally covered naked short sales using shares from stock offerings. Four cases were settled without admissions or denials of wrongdoing; the fifth is pending.

The reason company executives and short sellers debate the scope of naked short selling is partly because there aren't statistics that specifically measure such transactions.

750 Million Shares

New York-based Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., which processes the vast majority of U.S. trading, does keep track of how much stock has been sold and not delivered on schedule to the purchasers.

On an average day in March, those unsettled trades amounted to more than 750 million shares in almost 2,700 stocks, exchange- traded funds and other securities, according to Depository Trust & Clearing data obtained from the SEC through Freedom of Information Act requests.

Because there are innocuous reasons why stock may not get to the purchaser on time, such as paperwork delays, it's impossible to tell how many of those shares, known as failures to deliver, can be blamed on naked short sales, Depository Trust & Clearing spokesman Stuart Goldstein says. ``We're not in a position to know why trades fail,'' he says.

Failed deliveries of shares to buyers do provide the foundation for an SEC rule designed to blunt potential market manipulation. The measure is part of a broader package of short- selling rules known as Regulation SHO, for Short Sales.

Single Standard

The rule, called Reg SHO, was approved unanimously in 2004 after almost five years of consideration under three SEC chairmen. While Reg SHO doesn't outlaw naked short sales per se, it targets companies with enough failed deliveries to raise concerns about naked short selling, and it restricts further short sales of those stocks.

Reg SHO's short-selling restrictions took effect in January 2005.

The regulation's naked-shorting provisions were designed to create a single SEC standard to replace individual rules that previously were set by each exchange.

Supplanting exchange rules with one regulation meant the SEC, and not just market regulators, could police enforcement, says lawyer Chepucavage, 58, who helped draft Reg SHO. ``There was a belief that the markets weren't aggressive enough in enforcing the rules,'' he says. ``They tended to treat them as traffic ticket-type cases.''

Under the SEC rule, Nasdaq, the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange and smaller markets must get daily reports from Depository Trust & Clearing about failed deliveries.

The Restrictions

When an exchange finds that a company has accumulated unsettled trades equal to at least 10,000 shares and 0.5 percent of outstanding stock for five consecutive trading days, it's subject to stricter requirements for future short sales.

Exchanges keep the companies on these lists until failed deliveries fall back below the 0.5 percent level for five straight trading days.

Once a stock is on a list, Reg SHO requires any new short sales to be settled within 13 trading days. If shares haven't been delivered by that time, the brokerage involved in the sale must buy stock for delivery to the buyer.

If it doesn't, Reg SHO forbids the broker from handling additional short sales of that company's shares unless it makes binding arrangements to borrow the necessary stock. During June, more than 425 companies were on an exchange list.

Short Sales Increase

For the first year after the restrictions took effect in January 2005, the markets' lists suggest that Reg SHO cut down potential naked shorting. This year, the number of possible naked short sales has increased.

From February through May, the average lists reported more stocks than in any month since August 2005. The number of new companies that surpassed Reg SHO's thresholds for the first time also jumped in February, to an average of 18.5 from as few as 15 in October 2005.

Depository Trust & Clearing's statistics on total failed deliveries of shares to buyers show a similar trajectory: In February and March, more than 700 million shares that were sold were not delivered to buyers on an average day, the highest levels since December 2004, the month before Reg SHO took effect.

Shares of Inhibitex Inc., a biotech drug developer in Atlanta's northern suburb of Alpharetta, plummeted 9.8 percent on Feb. 27, their biggest one-day drop in more than 14 months and the worst showing among more than 160 stocks in the Nasdaq Biotech Index.

`Manipulating the Stock'

Nasdaq short sale records show that, during the two days ended on Feb. 27, short sellers traded almost 410,000 shares, up from fewer than 9,500 over the two preceding days. Enough traders failed to deliver stock over Reg SHO's limit for five straight days, so Nasdaq put Inhibitex on its list on March 8.

Company executives didn't return calls seeking comment.

Audible Inc., which sells audio newspapers and books on the Web, had delivery failures that broke Reg SHO's threshold from trading on Jan. 4. Over five days, short sales had averaged 309,000 shares, almost triple the level for the preceding week.

Audible, based in Wayne, New Jersey, ranked last in the 279- member Russell 2000 Technology Index during that stretch, falling 15.5 percent. ``When you're manipulating the stock, you're taking away from investors, the business itself and our employees,'' says David Joseph, 37, an Audible vice president.

These apparent short sale jumps were allowed by a snag in Reg SHO. Under the rule, delivery deadlines apply only to short sales made after a company appears on one of the markets' lists. Naked shorting before that point, including the trades that put a company over the rule's thresholds in the first place, can remain unsettled indefinitely.

SEC Reviews Rule

``It's a loophole which allows an unlimited number of fails against anybody,'' says Robert Shapiro, an economist and former U.S. undersecretary of commerce, who is a consultant for Christian and other lawyers representing alleged victims of naked shorting.

On July 12, the SEC voted unanimously to propose changes to short sale regulations that would remove that clause and set deadlines for settling trades before a stock is added to a threshold list. ``There are still persistent failures to deliver in the marketplace, and some of that is undoubtedly attributable to loopholes in our rule,'' SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said.

The hole in the rule helps explain why some companies have stayed on the threshold lists for months or longer.

As of July 17, New York-based Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc., popular with short sellers since its eponymous founder's March 2004 trial and prison sentence for lying to federal investigators probing insider trading, had been on the NYSE's threshold list 383 times, or every day since Reg SHO took effect more than 18 months earlier.

Krispy Kreme

Taser International Inc. had a 379-day streak on Nasdaq's list that ended on July 11. The stun gun manufacturer based in Scottsdale, Arizona, had faced an SEC probe of its accounting and product safety claims, and its shares fell 78 percent in 2005. The SEC ended its inquiry in May without bringing any charges.

Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., a one-time Wall Street favorite that fell from grace as the SEC investigated its accounting in 2004, was on the NYSE list for almost 18 months. Shares of the Winston-Salem, North Carolina-based company plunged 54 percent in 2005.

Taser and Krispy Kreme are typical examples of companies pounced on by short sellers after setbacks threaten stock prices. ``There's no doubt some companies have issues other than stock manipulation,'' Christian says.

``But they should be allowed to succeed or fail on their own and not because of manipulative market conditions,'' he says. ``This is not just attributable to whining companies that couldn't make it.''

14 Lawsuits Filed

The stakes in the debate were raised when an alliance of lawyers, including Christian, 53, and fellow Houston litigator John O'Quinn -- a billionaire from fees in a $206 billion tobacco industry settlement -- joined forces to represent companies alleging fraud in naked shorting.

The group has already filed 14 lawsuits against short sellers, brokers and Depository Trust & Clearing and plans at least 20, Christian says.

A short sale begins, like other trades, when investors tell their brokers they want to sell stock. Reg SHO says a broker must check to make sure a brokerage or institutional investor has stock it's willing to loan the short seller in time for settlement, which for most U.S. stock transactions takes place three business days after a trade.

`It's Demoralizing'

After confirming the availability of stock loans, brokers send a sell order to the appropriate exchange, where shares are sold to investors who want to buy the stock. There's no law requiring short sellers to actually borrow shares.

Last month, NYSE Regulation said it fined four securities firms a total of $1.25 million for Reg SHO-related violations, such as failing to properly confirm and document the availability of stock loans before handling short sales. The brokers, units of Daiwa Securities Group Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Citigroup Inc., and Credit Suisse Group, accepted the NYSE's fines without admitting or denying wrongdoing.

In a traditional short sale, buyers receive actual shares in a company. In a naked short sale, buyers effectively get an IOU promising that stock will be delivered at a later date.

When naked short sellers target a company, the results can be devastating, says David Vey, chairman of King of Prussia, Pennsylvania-based Sedona Corp., which sells software programs that help banks manage customer databases.

``It's demoralizing when you're working hard and someone else is staying awake at night trying to figure out how to take your money,'' Vey says.

`Prove Staying Power'

In 2003, the SEC filed a suit alleging that a single naked short seller, Rhino Advisors Inc., a New York-based investment firm, accounted for 40 percent of all Sedona transactions during 21 days in March 2001. The short sales came after the company sold debt securities that could be converted into shares.

The stock plunged from a high of $1.50 to as little as 72 cents in that period. Rhino settled the case in 2003 for $1 million without admitting or denying wrongdoing.

That kind of drubbing makes it difficult to attract new investors and capital and leaves potential customers wary, Vey says. ``You have to prove credibility and some kind of staying power,'' he says. ``People don't want to buy your product if they're worried you're not going to be here in two years.''

On July 10, Sedona shares closed at 21 cents in over-the- counter trading.

`A Bit Overdone'

Depository Trust & Clearing's Goldstein, 55, says failed deliveries represent only a tiny fraction of U.S. stock trading, and naked short selling is one of many explanations for settlement delays.

At the end of 2005, about 23,000 trades hadn't settled compared with about 26 million transactions on a typical day last year, Depository Trust & Clearing says. ``We're not saying there is no problem, but to suggest the sky is falling might be a bit overdone,'' Goldstein says.

While there's more than one reason shares might not be delivered to buyers, Depository Trust & Clearing statistics for the days immediately after the SEC announced it would have new rules show that there could have been hundreds of millions of naked short sales.

In eight trading days after the SEC released details of the new rule on July 28, 2004, failures to deliver skyrocketed 70 percent to more than 1 billion shares. They kept rising and, within a month, topped 2 billion shares.

Before the Rule

The size and suddenness of that surge suggests it was caused by a rush of naked short sales rather than a rash of bookkeeping snags, Chepucavage says. ``One might speculate that people were getting their naked short sales in before the rule took effect,'' he says.

The rule's dependence on threshold lists was aimed at weeding out most of the clerical delays in stock sales that didn't produce shares at settlement, says Boni, 49, who's now a managing director at UNX Inc., a brokerage in Burbank, California.

Short sales and stock price movements for companies added to the SEC's lists, in some cases, recall an old saying: Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean that someone's not out to get you.

In April, Z-Trim Holdings Inc., which makes a calorie-free fat substitute for processed foods, hired lawyers Christian and O'Quinn to investigate whether naked short sellers sold shares of the company, which is based in the Chicago suburb of Mundelein.

`Huge Losses'

Reg SHO data show that Z-Trim, then known as Circle Group Holdings Inc., was placed on the American Stock Exchange's threshold list on March 3, 2005, reflecting failed deliveries from trading through Feb. 22.

Over five trading days, daily short sales climbed to almost 40,000 shares on Feb. 22, from 3,300 a week earlier, while Circle Group's stock fell 24 percent to 76 cents from $1.

``Stock manipulators can cause huge losses for real people who invested real money,'' Z-Trim CEO Gregory Halpern says. The company retained lawyers to try to protect its investors, he says.

``We aren't sitting here complaining that our stock was manipulated, woe is me,'' Halpern, 48, says. ``But having been thrust into that battle, we're going to fight like hell, because we have a responsibility to our shareholders.''

For Dallas-based business software maker I2 Technologies Inc., threshold-busting trades occurred on Sept. 30, 2005, when short sales more than doubled to 51,000 shares from 21,000 the previous day. I2's shares fell 10.1 percent to $18.64 from $20.73.

Worst Day

That was the stock's worst day in almost eight months and the third-biggest decline in the 575-member Nasdaq Computer Index. Company executives declined to comment.

Meanwhile, companies continue to see shares tumble under possible pressure from naked short sales. A month after Movie Gallery's stock collapsed in February, the company's investors had an even worse day, on March 8, after the company met with lenders about revising restrictions regarding loans.

Over two days, shares fell more than 34 percent, while short sales averaged 2.5 million shares -- up from an average of 300,000 during the previous week. Trading on March 8 created enough failed deliveries that Movie Gallery was again added to Nasdaq's threshold list.

Cromwell Coulson, CEO of New York-based Pink Sheets LLC, which runs a market for over-the-counter stocks, says making more information public about short sales is a key to fighting abuses, particularly for investors and executives in small companies.

For example, under a new NASD rule, Nasdaq's threshold lists in July started including failures to deliver for shares of some small, over-the-counter companies that weren't covered by Reg SHO. Nasdaq also began including OTC Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets companies in monthly short-interest reports in July.

`A Bogeyman'

``Naked short selling has been a bogeyman; it was like Bigfoot,'' Coulson, 40, says. ``Everybody thought it was out there, but nobody knew for sure.''

Sedona's Vey says regulators at the SEC and each stock market need to hit some abusive traders with multimillion-dollar fines. ``They need to make a few examples out of people,'' he says. Until penalties are big enough to take the profit out of stock manipulation, he says, all the rules and procedures in the world will make no difference.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Drummond in Washington at bdrummond@bloomberg.net .

Last Updated: August 4, 2006 01:39 EDT

Tuesday, August 29, 2006

Makes Me Uncomfortable....

"Of all speculative blunders there are few worse than trying to average a losing game. My cotton deal proved it to the hilt a little later. Always sell what shows you a loss and keep what shows you a profit. That was so obviously the wise thing to do and was so well known to me that even now I marvel at myself for doing the reverse. "

-- Jesse Livermore --

Monday, August 21, 2006

Bashers are Just Misunderstood Good Samaritans?

From the I*Hub PAVC board:

(P.S. IMHO- These two clowns are a tag team comedy act- bash, bash and bash till they buy in and then pump, pump and pump)

Posted by: im a survivor
In reply to: shortsinthesand who wrote msg# 11098 Date:8/21/2006 1:36:54 PM
Post #of 11134

ON TOPIC FOR ANY BOARD!!!!!!

Did you catch this piece on message boards? Quite interesting reading, imo.....Note the portion in bold, although the whole article is a good read.....long, short, doesnt matter....great article, imo...

A Requiem for the message boards
Once a boards enthusiast, our columnist explains why he's had it.
By David Futrelle

If you ever feel like making a lot of enemies in a hurry, wander onto the message boards at Yahoo!, Silicon Investor or Raging Bull and say something less than flattering about, oh, any stock you feel like. It doesn't matter if that company's CEO has fled to the Caymans with his hairdresser and a briefcase full of Ben Franklins. If you persist in your criticism for more than a post or two, you'll quickly find yourself the least popular person at the party. In fact, you'll find yourself labeled a "basher"--roughly the equivalent of being charged with high treason.

Stock message boards have long been celebrated as a democratizing force in the world of finance. This is a crock. They are democracies only if you share the same rosy opinions as everyone else there. Whenever a basher speaks up (and basher, mind you, is liberally defined--it can apply not just to a poster who accuses a company chairman of pedophilia but to anyone who might note that 120 times earnings is an awful lot to pay for a share of Cisco) you can be sure that someone (or a half-dozen someones) will tear into him with all the subtlety of Mao's Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

It's a truism on the boards that anyone who has anything critical to say about a company must be a short-seller (an investor who has placed a bet that a stock will go down rather than up). Perhaps this is true. But many basher-bashers have also convinced themselves that most stock critics are the minions of vast (usually unnamed) short-selling cabals that pay handsomely for pessimistic posts. Various documents purporting to explain "How Bashers Get Paid" circulate widely. One claims that bashers are paid (by whomever or whatever it is that pays them) according to the number of replies their posts generate. "A basher will attempt to milk three to five replies per post at one to two dollars each," says the anonymous text.

Basher paranoia is somewhat more understandable on the penny-stock boards, where stock manipulation is rampant. But there the real problem isn't the bashers--it's the boosters. In a pump-and-dump scheme, hypesters buy a worthless stock, tout it incessantly and then dump their holdings for a quick profit after enough suckers have piled on. Strangely enough, while the Securities and Exchange Commission has brought plenty of cases against Net pump-and-dumpers in the past few years, it has yet to find a single bash-for-pay conspiracy in action.

Since they stand to gain when others lose, it is easy to demonize stock bashers and short-sellers, to see them as "black of heart," as Wall Street wag Fred Schwed put it in his 1940 classic Where are the Customers' Yachts? After all, isn't it somehow un-American to hope a company fails, somehow evil to want a stock to go down? Maybe so, but even Schwed affirmed that a wide diversity of opinions on stocks is better than a single Pollyannaish view. "Dictatorships always immediately ban short-selling, since it is axiomatic that no professional pessimists are going to be tolerated," Schwed quipped at a time when Americans had good reasons to worry about foreign dictators. "But whatever the reader may think of totalitarian philosophy in general, I do not think he will envy them for the condition of their security markets."

Just three or four years ago, stock message boards promised to become a liberating force, a public forum free from the tyranny of the experts, where investors could go to compare notes on stocks and hash out disagreements about valuations. Today the boards can only be regarded as a failed experiment. Remember the so-called Iomegans at the Motley Fool during the late 1990s--the herd of investors who convinced themselves that a small computer disk-drive manufacturer in Utah was the next Microsoft and then proceeded to follow the stock off a cliff? That may have been the first indication that stock evaluation is not best done by committee. And these days it's hard to find any message board that hasn't degenerated into an embarrassing squabble between dogmatic longs and beleaguered (if equally dogmatic) shorts. For most serious investors, it can finally be said: Stock message boards are an utter and total waste of time.

At its root, the boards' problem rests with their mix of unquestioning, optimistic conviction and intolerance of dissent. These are two qualities you can find in many moments of America at its worst. The mandatory positivity many posters want to enforce is reminiscent of the blandly dogmatic (and thus menacing) Boosters' Clubs satirized by Sinclair Lewis in his 1922 novel Babbitt. The clubs, fraternal organizations for gung-ho local businessmen, offered "Booster Brothers" a place they go could go to exchange business cards and snappy pleasantries--so long as they didn't suggest that anything was less than peachy keen. Never was heard a discouraging word--it was practically in the bylaws. There was quite a bit of this sort of boosterism in the '20s. You may recall how that decade ended.

http://www.money.com/money/depts/websmart/webwatch/archive/000725.html

Thursday, August 10, 2006

Eat My Shorts (Please)

Eat My Shorts!

A Naked Shorting Primer for CEOs.

Cale Smith, Senior Associate/Hawk Associates, Inc.

The drama surrounding naked shorting has all the elements of a John Grisham novel. Sly, blue blood institutions conspire with shadowy hedge fund cowboys to unmercifully assault a well-meaning but outgunned CEO in his quest for shareholder value. Offshore accounts and corrupt foreign officials veil the crimes for decades, until finally being thrust into the open through the hyper-caffeinated efforts of hundreds of message board denizens throughout cyberspace.

As with most Grisham novels, however, liberties may have to be taken with the original story to romanticize an otherwise bland topic. After all, it’s hard to make CUSIP numbers and stock certificates sound sexy, but that’s really the heart of the naked shorting controversy.
Due largely to concerns raised by microcap CEOs and their shareholders, naked shorting is a hot topic on message boards. Opinions range widely on how common it is. Those claiming it pervades the markets and foreshadows a systemic meltdown are met with equally fervent arguments calling it an over-hyped, isolated problem that is becoming the grassy knoll conspiracy theory of Wall Street.

Everyone agrees, however, that risks of naked shorting are heightened in the microcap world. The sheer number of small public companies, combined with high volatility and an almost inevitable need for financing, make detecting this hard-to-prove crime that much more difficult for the microcap CEO. Although the odds seem small that a particular company will be victimized, there is no authoritative data indicating how many microcaps are being naked shorted.

Keeping those odds in perspective, then, this primer is for microcap CEOs curious about the naked shorting fuss. On the off chance that a company attracts naked shorts, CEOs should recognize that there is despairingly little that can be done to stop it from occurring. Due to the nature of the crime, legal expertise may not help.

Although there seem to be few bulletproof ways to stop naked shorts, there are a handful of things a proactive CEO can do to reduce the odds of being blindsided by this notorious lot. This primer includes a rough sketch of how naked shorting works and a brief familiarization with the main players. A worst-case scenario of what it means to be targeted by naked shorts is presented, as are suggestions for wary CEOs. The final section contains a list of links with more about the intriguing world of naked shorting.


WHAT IS NAKED SHORTING, AND WHY SHOULD A CEO CARE?

In its simplest terms, naked shorting involves selling shares of stock that don’t exist. It’s performed routinely by market-makers to keep an orderly market, but it is illegal when done to manipulate a company’s stock price. Only when someone intends to drive down the stock price is naked shorting breaking the law. Throughout the rest of this overview, any reference to naked shorting will refer to the illegal variety.

It’s also worth noting the important distinction between shorting and naked shorting. The former is perfectly legal and occurs extensively as either a way for an investor to mitigate risk or as a bet that a company’s share price will decrease (i.e. the short-seller or “short” believes the company is overvalued). Despite the wary glances often cast upon them, shorts are an essential part of a robust market and are often the first to discover financial fraud, as in the case of Enron.

A short will sell borrowed shares as a bet against a company because he believes the price will eventually drop. These borrowed shares come from his broker, which loans the short a certain number of shares (not dollars). As soon as the short receives the borrowed shares in his account, he sells them immediately for cash, which goes to his brokerage account. The short still has that pesky loan to pay back, though, and does so by waiting for the price of the stock to drop. Then he buys some cheaper shares using money from the same pool of cash he received after the original sale, gives the broker his shares back, and keeps whatever cash is left in his account.

Naked shorts, in contrast, are much more manipulative – they sell short shares that don’t exist and then attempt to actively lower the company’s share price through constant short-selling pressure. By using pretend shares, of which there is an unlimited supply, naked shorts can effectively control the share price through this constant pressure, eventually driving the price of a company’s shares into the basement.

Where do these fake shares come from? Naked shorts can create them out of thin air, depending on your point of view, due to either (a) glaring inefficiencies in the back-office world of certificate transfers, or (b) institutionalized fraud on a massive scale. Either way, the effects can be disastrous for companies who are victimized.

WHO IS INVOLVED?

Naked shorting is typically done by hedge funds with arm’s length support from several other parties. The extent of active assistance provided to the fund by these related groups is unclear but hotly debated. One player is the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. (DTCC), which tracks the stock certificates of traded shares between brokerages. When a fund sells short a share of stock, the fund’s brokerage (another prominent player) has a settlement period of three days to deliver those shares to the buyer’s broker. If the transfer doesn’t occur, the DTCC notifies the fund’s broker that it has “FTD’d” (Failed to Deliver). The DTCC is required by the SEC to enforce delivery of missing shares. While waiting to account for shares, the DTCC may charge the brokerage to borrow similar shares from its own inventory.

The obvious conflict of interest here is that DTCC is policing its own customers - the brokerages. In response to complaints, the SEC required all exchanges to comply with Regulation SHO in January of 2005. Reg SHO establishes several requirements aimed at broker-dealers, but it does not specifically address the manipulative aspects of naked shorting, which fall under existing securities law.

Regulation SHO specifically requires the major exchanges to provide a daily list of Threshold Securities, defined as those that (1) have an aggregate fail to deliver position of over 10,000 shares (2) equal to 0.5% of the issuer’s total shares outstanding for (3) greater than five days. Reg SHO also requires a broker-dealer to close out any “open fail” position once it has been included on an exchange’s Threshold Security list for 13 consecutive days. The ironic effect of this policy, as noted by its detractors, is that it effectively requires shorts to cover (buy back shares) after they’ve had two weeks to drive the price down - meaning they profit from the trade. Needless to say, the effectiveness of such a regulation is often called into question among the cyberspace crowd.

Links to the Threshold Security list for each primary exchange are included at the conclusion of this article. It’s important to remember that seeing a company included on the Threshold Securities list does not mean that company is being naked shorted nor that its share price is artificially depressed. It means shares in that company are failing to deliver on time for what may be legitimate reasons, including simple human error. Even shares bought long could FTD and show up on the Threshold list. A daily presence on the Threshold list for more than 13 days at a time, however, might signal the need for deeper digging.

HOW DOES NAKED SHORTING ACTUALLY WORK?

Based on the accounts of CEOs who believe they have been the target of naked shorts, here is how the worst-case scenario might play out using an ill-intentioned hedge fund (“Fund Malicious”) as an example.

Fund Malicious first identifies a target in the microcap world for naked shorting, most likely an obscure company in the development stage or having otherwise questionable fundamentals. The hedge fund gets that firm listed on a foreign exchange in, say, Berlin, via a request funneled through a complicit broker or official in that country. Malicious then sells short shares it doesn’t have (naked shorts them), waits three days for the DTCC to call and ask for the shares, and then replies either, “I borrowed them on the Berlin exchange, and they’ll take some time to get here,” or “I’m a market-maker for that company’s shares in Berlin and naked shorting rules don’t apply there.” The DTCC then loans the fund shares from its inventory and charges the broker a fee until the stock loan is repaid. Malicious, in the meantime, continues to drive the price of the target’s shares down as long and as aggressively as possible. In the event the fund does cover to pay off the stock loan, it doesn’t take much effort to begin the naked shorting cycle again.

Other theories exist as to how the hedge fund might skirt additional rules. To prevent “piling on,” exchange rules mandate that a stock cannot be shorted on a downtick or decrease in stock price. In other words, Malicious must wait for the stock price to increase briefly before shorting the company. Rather than wait passively for an uptick, though, Fund Malicious can create an uptick in the stock itself by purchasing a few shares through a small offshore account. The hedge fund is then free to short (or naked short) the company with both barrels at home.
Malicious may get additional leverage out of the original naked short by choosing to target an ugly, obscure microcap company. By driving the price down, the fund hopes to scare existing shareholders into selling their shares, too, out of fear that something is going on that they don’t know about (i.e. the fund can “paint the tape”). This, of course, drives the price even lower while further obscuring the role of Fund Malicious.

There is plenty of room for additional mischief in the above scenario. According to the most vocal critics of naked shorting, funds like Malicious have relationships with reporters and/or message board regulars who are compensated to distribute negative news about the company in order to exaggerate the selling. There is also plenty of irony possible, in that a CEO can be her shareholders’ worst enemy by merely uttering the words “naked shorting.” Investors may panic, the stock might dive further and legitimate short-sellers could begin to circle.

KEEPING THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE

Given the mysterious nature of hedge funds and the convoluted nature of this crime, it’s easy to get carried away with paranoid scenarios regarding naked shorting. The skeptics, however, have some unanswered questions of their own. For instance:• What’s in it for the brokerages? Are they supposed to take all the risk just to get a few more commissions or under-the-table money? Since when have they been that desperate?

• Has anyone ever been found guilty of naked shorting?

• Where is the proof? Are there other pieces of evidence that would suggest a crime is being committed?

• Why aren’t more companies making noise about it? Where are the whistleblowers?

• Wouldn’t the unintentional buyers of naked-shorted shares voice their concerns when they did not receive proxy votes?

• Why is there no outrage from legitimate funds and brokerages?

• How much regulatory burden should the SEC and other publicly traded companies have to bear to resolve the questionable problems of a few companies?

Both camps raise legitimate issues that simply cannot be addressed definitively yet. Reg SHO is not the deterrent the problem seems to demand. There have been numerous calls on the SEC to increase the scope of data provided in the daily Threshold Securities lists, which may help better gauge the seriousness of this problem. Until those issues are resolved, the SEC continues to consider the surveillance and enforcement of trading activity as the primary responsibility of the markets and exchanges. The DTCC considers its role to be reporting the FTDs. Brokerages are doing all they can to win commissions from hedge funds. Detection is difficult, accusations are nearly impossible to prove, and nobody has figured out a foolproof way to stop this crime.
So what’s all that mean for the microcap CEO? When it comes to naked shorting, you are your own best watchdog.

WHAT TO DO IF YOU THINK YOU MAY BE TARGETED

Above all else, be discrete with your public accusations.

A well-intentioned CEO can fulfill his own prophecy by going public with accusations of naked shorting. Investors may flee the stock, further lowering the share price. Meanwhile, other funds may hover, waiting for an uptick to begin shorting your company themselves.
Watch your trading volume.

If you’re seeing four or five times your company’s float trade hands in an otherwise ordinary day, and you have no large share overhangs, pay attention. Start documenting those patterns.
Keep your focus on operations.

Your stock price is not declining exclusively due to naked shorting. Weakness in the business, industry, model, communications or management team exists well before naked shorting begins and allows it to continue. In most cases, the best deterrent for shorts of any kind is consistent execution and credible communications with your shareholders.
Always surprise on the upside.

By maintaining absolute secrecy before good news, you give yourself the best chance to catch the shorts off guard and maybe even squeeze them. Be conscious of unintended signals you may send when in public appearances, conference calls and analyst meetings before a particularly good quarter or other surprising good news. Keep your cards close to your chest and save those glowing press releases for the middle of the trading day.

Maintain a steady stream of news.

By communicating with your investors as often as possible, you remove some of the mystery surrounding a company that a naked shorter typically targets. In the absence of any company news, a continuously dropping stock price is the only communication your investors are hearing. Sales of stock by legitimate owners are sure to follow.

Put floors on your convertibles.

A floorless convertible bond (also known as a “convertible death spiral”) is an open invitation for its owners to short the stock as aggressively as possible. A constant decline in share price means the convertible owners will get more shares because the initial rate of conversion will change. While the original shareholders may very well lose their entire stake in the company, the convertible owners can continue to short the stock until they can effectively cover the original short with new shares created by a new rate. Should those convertibles be held offshore where naked shorting is not illegal, the potential for price depression becomes even greater. Ensuring you have a floor on those converts will prevent the worst case scenario.

Monitor small international exchanges.

If your firm unexpectedly turns up on the Berlin-Bremen stock exchange and you, the CEO, did not request a listing there, that might be a sign of a problem. Request the removal of your company from that exchange immediately, and keep asking until it’s done.

Realize your choice of financing vehicle may attract naked shorting interest.

In addition to floorless convertibles, PIPEs may also attract undue attention from potential funders. Since shares in a PIPE are sold for below market price, the provider could short the stock down to that level with no risk of capital loss on his part. When issuing warrants with the deal, you’re also effectively pushing the price lower through increased dilution of existing shareholders. While it’s true that sometimes beggars can’t be choosers when it comes to raising funds, go into those negotiations with your eyes wide open.

Check the Threshold Security lists.

Links to the lists at each exchange are below. Keep in mind that inclusion on that list does not mean naked shorting or any other improper activity is occurring, just that some shares meet the three requirements mentioned above. An extended presence on the Threshold list, however, in combination with other signals may be an important sign.

Don’t read the message boards.

You’ll drive yourself nuts, waste a ton of time and eventually convince yourself you’re a victim of someone’s ill wishes, naked shorts or otherwise. If you’re that compelled to monitor the boards, ask your IR team to send you weekly summaries of any cogent posts.

Know your IR company.

Consider your choice of an investor relations firm as your first line of defense. Does the company have expertise in dealing with naked shorting? Does the price of your stock mysteriously rise or fall between the time you send your draft press releases and when they hit the wires? Do they have long-term clients willing to vouch for their integrity? And do they have processes in place to handle sensitive information?

Know your transfer agent.

Given that the process of naked shorting begins at the brokerage level, there’s not much your company’s transfer agent can do with regards to those shares. The responsibility for tracking them lies with the brokerage. It is theoretically possible, however, for a corrupt transfer agent to conceal the true float and otherwise manipulate the shares themselves.

Both your transfer agent and IR firm should be able to advise you on the effectiveness of combating naked shorts by changing CUSIP numbers, reverse mergers, and/or reverse splits. Although the long-term effectiveness of these strategies is questionable, it may be useful as part of a larger strategy to deter naked shorting. After changing your company’s CUSIP number, for instance, all existing stock certificates must be exchanged for new ones. All issued and outstanding certificates from old shares will no longer represent an interest in the company until exchanged. This may be more trouble than it’s worth, however. Once the new shares are in circulation, there’s nothing to stop a new round of naked shorting by determined parties. Such tactics may represent a small part of an overall strategy to reduce naked shorting interest in your company.

Questions?

Please feel free to contact Cale Smith at Hawk Associates at either csmith@hawkassociates.com or (305) 451-1888 with any questions or comments.

Links:
The SEC on Key Points About Regulation SHO
DTCC on Naked Short Selling and the Stock Borrow Program
Professor John Finnerty of Fordham University on "Short Selling, Death Spiral Convertibles, and the Profitability of Stock Manipulation."
The CEO of Overstock.com explains naked shorting
An open letter from the CEO of Eagletech to the DTCC
Naked Shorts – What I Have Learned. By Mark Cuban
Motley Fool: The Naked Truth on Illegal Shorting
Motley Fool: Who’s Behind Naked Shorting
The National Coalition Against Naked Shorting
NASDAQ Threshold Securities List (for NASDAQ, OTCBB and OTC issues)
NYSE Threshold Securities List
AMEX Threshold Securities List
Chicago Stock Exchange
ArcaEx
Berlin-Bremen Stock Exchange

To report alleged abusive naked short selling activity: enforcement@sec.gov

For more information on how to submit potential violations of Federal securities laws: http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml

Friday, August 04, 2006

From the PMHJ I*Hub Board

Posted by: fugeguy
In reply to: None Date:8/4/2006 10:17:15 AM
Post #of 942

The broker restrictions have killed any chance for a quick run here. We were on the cusp of exploding the other day when the news about the coming restrictions hit.

IMHO, this is the opening shot in the brokers covering their azzes in stocks they are short in.

Step 1-

Run starts

Step 2-

The brokerage house realize that OMG, we are short 30% (or more) of the float in that one.

Step 3-

Label the sudden pps or rise in volume as unusual activity and restrict (read slow or nearly stop) trading.

Step 4-

Run dies and price drops.

Do not doubt for a moment that stocks like PAIM and PAIV (plus many others) will not lead to the brokerage houses taking steps to make sure they stay on the side of the trades they want to be on. They are the house after all....

-- Fire trucking mother truckin crooks --

>> As always, IMHO <<

http://www.pmhj.blogspot.com/

Wednesday, August 02, 2006

An Open Question

Can anyone define "unusual activities?"

Brokergate


I did not believe it until it happened to me:

PR

Wednesday August 2, 2:08 PM EDT

SALT LAKE CITY, Aug 02, 2006 (BUSINESS WIRE) -- PrimeHoldings.com Inc. (Pink Sheets: PMHJ), a diversified holding company with early mover initiatives in the oil and gas industry, today announced it has entered into a letter of intent to acquire the drilling rights of a 30-mile extension of the Anton-Irish field, a prolific Lower Clearfork Reef oil field that has produced over 220 million barrels of oil since its discovery in 1946 by Humble Oil.

"In 2001, the current operator of the Anton-Irish field, Occidental-Permian, began drilling into the Wolfcamp dolomite. To date they have 33 new wells that have produced over 6 million barrels of oil," stated Thomas Aliprandi, CEO of PrimeHoldings. "The leasehold has been compiled using well log data from deep wells drilled in the area, seismic interpretation and radiometric surveys. The extension reef structure mapped is over three times the potential of the Anton-Irish reef," Aliprandi continued.

For additional information about PrimeHoldings.com, go to www.stockinformationsystems.com and search for PMHJ.

"Safe Harbor" Statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

Statements in this press release relating to plans, strategies, economic performance and trends, projections of results of specific activities or investments, and other statements that are not descriptions of historical facts may be forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Forward-looking information is inherently subject to risks and uncertainties, and actual results could differ materially from those currently anticipated due to a number of factors, which include, but are not limited to, risk factors inherent in doing business. Forward-looking statements may be identified by terms such as "may," "will," "should," "could," "expects," "plans," "intends," "anticipates," "believes," "estimates," "predicts," "forecasts," "potential," or "continue," or similar terms or the negative of these terms. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance or achievements. The company has no obligation to update these forward-looking statements.

SOURCE: PrimeHoldings.com Inc.

CONTACT: PrimeHoldings.com Inc., Salt Lake City Thomas Aliprandi, 801-755-6859 ir@primeholdings.com